Ukraine in Africa: Was its role in big Wagner defeat in Mali an own goal?

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba was touring Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius last week. But after the harsh words from Ecowas and Senegal he may now have to engage in some serious fence-mending in West Africa.

What many sub-Saharan African governments – even those that privately mistrust Moscow – will probably view as Kyiv’s unhelpful outside military adventurism could dispel the goodwill so painstakingly cultivated over the past two years through peaceful Ukrainian diplomacy.

Of course in narrow military terms, helping to inflict the heaviest-ever African defeat on Wagner was a success for the Ukrainians.

The mercenary contractor – now officially renamed Corps Africa after being brought under Russian state control – had doubled its manpower to an estimated 2,000 in Mali over the past two years.

So news of the heavy losses in Tinzaouaten came as a shock, particularly given that the Malian army and Wagner forces had seized Kidal, the Tuareg rebel “capital”, last November.

The Tinzaouaten incident has signalled the separatists’ return to the offensive –with, it soon became clear, the support of a new partner.

Kyiv’s hints of direct involvement confirm how far it is prepared to reach in taking its fightback against Russia’s President Vladimir Putin well beyond the home battlefield.

In fact this is not the first such direct intervention against Wagner military operations in Africa.

There were strong indications that last August and September Ukrainian special forces carried out drone raids in Sudan in support of the military regime led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

For more than a year, it has been engaged in a brutal power struggle with its former allies the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti”, who has been assisted by Wagner.

Some Ukrainian military commentators, such as Evgeniy Dikiy, former commander of Ukraine’s Aidar battalion, depict their country’s reported African military interventions very much in terms of a battle for survival after Russian forces invaded in February 2022.

Mr Dikiy has argued that Kyiv has no Africa policy but does have scores to settle with Russia and Wagner in particular.

But the administration of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may not see things in quite such simplistic terms.

For it knows that the fightback against Moscow is not only conducted on the battlefield. Diplomacy and trade matter too.

And in the immediate aftermath of the 2022 invasion, Kyiv was painfully reminded of this truth, particularly in regards to Africa.

In the UN General Assembly on 2 March that year, only 28 of the 54 African member states voted to condemn the invasion.

While only a few close allies of Moscow actually voted in support of Russia’s action, many other African governments, including some generally perceived as firmly pro-Western, actively abstained or absented themselves from the vote.

And later, when President Putin pulled out of the deal allowing both Ukrainian and Russia grain exports – many destined for Africa – to safely transit through the Black Sea, many sub-Saharan governments chose to view this setback in neutral terms rather than blaming Moscow.

While that particular issue has faded in significance, because Ukraine has largely recovered its freedom to ship grain after striking the Russian Black Sea fleet, the foreign ministry team in Kyiv has remained convinced of the need to rebuild their political and economic networks across Africa.

Mr Kuleba has now made four African tours. And while his campaign to earn goodwill and build partnerships south of the Sahara has not always advanced without a hitch – hopes of being received by President Cyril Ramaphosa during a visit to South Africa late last year were disappointed – there have also been important successes.